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Abstract—Information sharing has been considered a critical
solution against the ever-increasing complexity of cyber-attacks.
In this effort Cyber Threat Intelligence is undergoing a process
of increasing its maturity levels. The quantification of the quality
of shared information and the assessment of trust amongst
information sharing entities is an important part of the process.
The Trust and Quality Tool has been designed as a tool with the
aim of improving the trust in the relevancy of shared information
by enabling an option to assess its trustworthiness and defining
a set of metrics for trust and quality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sharing of the Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) has been
presented and utilised as a rewarding solution to the ever-
increasing complexity of cyberattacks [1]–[3]. The maturity
level of CTI communities and applications acting on this
highly valued - actionable threat information increases along
with the complexity of cyberattacks. It has also been of
paramount importance to quantify the quality of the shared
information and assess trust amongst information sharing enti-
ties [4]–[6]. Several issues and challenges have been identified
so far by the CTI community and data quality measurement
has been reported as one of them [7].
The idea behind defining trust and quality metrics for the
threat intelligence data that is shared amongst CTI commu-
nities is to decrease the level of information overload as
well as reduce false positives, which are common in most
CTI sharing platforms. A metric is defined as a consistent
standard of measurement. It allows us to measure attributes
and behaviours of interest. In order to improve the trust
between partners and the quality of the threat intelligence they
share, we first need to be able to measure these two parameters.
These are also interdependent, adding a layer of complexity to
the task. Establishing trust between partners heavily depends
on improving the quality of information shared among them.
However, measuring the quality of threat intelligence data is
not an easy task as it involves many variables and requires
thorough research beforehand. Also, it is difficult to determine
how organisations define high-quality threat intelligence.
The methodology described in this paper aims to propose
another approach for the definition of these metrics and to
demonstrate how they are to be used to rate the quality of
threat intelligence data shared between partners. By doing so,
this methodology will aid improving the trust in the relevancy
of information shared among them. This will also enable an
option to assess the trustworthiness of received information
and its source, based on metrics directly attributed to the
trust level. This research presents an implementation of the
calculation of these metrics by a software plugin named
Trust and Quality Tool (TQM) leveraging a cyber threat
intelligence sharing software named ECHO - Early Warning
System (E-EWS) developed within the efforts of the acknowl-
edged ECHO project. Within the activities of the project, four
cybersecurity tabletop exercises have been organised amongst
the partners of the project and TQM has been applied to the
CTI that has been created during these exercises. The collected
CTI has also been evaluated by security experts, cybersecurity
software developers and cybersecurity academics within the
ECHO network and the metrics have been improved and
calibrated accordingly.
The contributions of this research are as follows:
• To define trust and quality metrics for CTI
• To present TQM tool for calculation and evaluation of
these metrics in the E-EWS environment
• To present the quality and trust calculations of the pro-
duced CTI of the tabletop exercises
• To present the calibration of the tool using expert views
within the ECHO network
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2
presents the literature on information quality on cyber threat
intelligence and conducts a brief survey towards them, Section
3 defines the methodology, introduces the E-EWS, tabletop
exercises and the metrics. Section 4 explains the requirements,
structure and development of the TQM. Moreover, Section 5
presents the evaluation and calibration of TQM guided by
the CTI collected with tabletop exercises while Section 6
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CTI Quality and Trust
According to the ENISA report “Actionable Information
for Security Incident Response” [8], the five criteria that an
information should meet to be actionable and support decision
makers are accuracy, relevance, timeliness, completeness, and
ingestibility. A recent survey shows that contemporary CTI
feeds do not make it up to the requirements and expecta-
tions of IT security practitioners [8], especially regarding the
aforementioned criteria. Threat Intelligence Sharing Platforms
(TISPs) are trying to achieve the goal of meeting these
requirements by creating policies and software that produces
and shares actionable information.
The quality of data of the shared feeds can be seen as
a vector compiled by the criteria of timeliness, accuracy,
scope, relevance and completeness are used in references [9],
[10] to measure the quality of the data and further evaluate
the available threat intelligent feeds. In [11], a threat score
function is introduced to evaluate Indicators of Compromise
(IoC) collected from various sources in order to support
Security Operations Centre (SOC) analysts prioritise the in-
cidents’ analysis. Another study [10] investigates the data
quality dimensions of IoCs which are collected by several open
sources in order to assess their effectiveness.
The challenges of data quality in TISPs were also researched
and presented in the works of Sillaber et al. [4], aiming to
address the factors affecting data quality of CTI at each of the
levels of gathering, storing, processing, and sharing data. Their
analysis was based on the data quality dimensions mentioned
above with consistency added as another factor.
The quality of the data generated by incident response teams
during investigations is discussed in [5]. According to this
analysis, there is still a lot of future work to be done towards
enhancing the quality of data generated by incident response
teams in order to facilitate and support CTI. The same metrics
were suggested by S. Sadiq in his handbook [9] under the
category titled ‘data values’ which is one of the three main
categories defining the dimensions of data quality in his work.
The list of challenges extends over to the information secu-
rity features of privacy and trust. Applying privacy preserving
mechanisms introduces a trade-off between the effectiveness
of the process of information sharing and compliance with pri-
vacy preserving guidelines and policies [10], [11]. Moreover,
trustworthiness of a CTI source is evaluated in the studies of
[12], [13] in the aim of providing a more rigorous trust-model.
Diverse data models, tools and standards might affect the
actionability, timeliness and consistency in regards of inter-
operability between TISPs [14], [15]. For that reason, the
standardisation of CTI is crucial for the improvement of
analytical and management capabilities in order to further
increase the quality of the shared CTI. An implementation
of this ideas has been done recently in MISP [16], an overall
score is given based on tags present in the CTI and the source
reliability, also an analysis is done per type of attribute of the
CTI using a decay function to quantify its quality. Although
the use of a trust in a source in the scoring is used, the
article mentions the historical data sharing should be part of
future research. Another TISP project developed in the scope
of H2020 PROTECTIVE [17] assess the quality of data as
well as the entity producing the CTI using a computational
trust method which aggregates multiple properties to generate
an overall reputation score of Threat intelligence feeds. In the
end the CTI quality is calculated using a default configuration
that uses schema completeness, freshness, relevant associated
tags and source reputation.
There are several approaches to determine Trust, further
described in [12]. To the best of our knowledge, the TISPs
that are mentioned in this study do not establish trust using
automated mechanisms.
There are also different approaches to what should define
the quality of information shared. Based on the analysis
described above, many CTI sharing platforms do not provide
any extensive description related to the relevance of the threat
intelligence other than the decay function related to timeliness.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Enter E-EWS: ECHO’s Early Warning System and Tabletop
Exercises
The answer to the ever-increasing complexity and speed
of cyber attack campaigns from cybersecurity communities
is the fast and accurate sharing of actionable cyber threat
intelligence. E-EWS is designed as a security operations
support tool for increasing the incident handling capacities
and enabling members of a community to share and coordi-
nate with actionable CTI in near real-time level.The tabletop
exercises (TTX) are part of the evaluation of the E-EWS. The
purpose of the TTXs is to evaluate the development of EWS’
platform and its added features, identify possible bugs, while
at the same time monitoring the information-sharing policies
during its operation.
During the exercises, the participating teams are exposed
to a series of injects that require an incident response and
allow them to engage by sharing information, according to
their decision-making policies, the situational awareness of the
incident and its nature.
The main concept behind the creation of the scenarios is
the development of a main theme that is addressed by all
the participants and some secondary/complementary incidents
that will be delivered to the participants at any given moment
during the exercise. The main theme of the exercise is not a
collection of regular incidents, the other incidents are common
incidents that incident response teams face at an almost daily
rate. In the 2nd and 3rd TTX, each participant received two
secondary incidents which revealed the main topic and the way
they were convoluted in order to affect the organisation.
The scenarios involve complex and interrelated situations
that provide the teams with motives to share tickets with the
rest of the EWS. Since the purpose of a TTX is the generation
and circulation of information, the users can share information
internally (either to the whole team or specific users) or
externally (information can be forwarded to specific entities
Fig. 1. Component View of the TQM Tool
or whole constituencies). The injections for the exercises
are prepared from events in incident response, contemporary
cybersecurity news, newly released vulnerabilities, and the
characteristics of the organisations and of ECHO as a consor-
tium. On occasion, an incident can be designed to specifically
test the use of a new feature or tool or to fulfil a request of a
team for specific testing.
Another useful addition to the scenarios is the “hourlies”,
tickets created by the organisers and shared in the con-
stituencies to increase cyber situational awareness. The tickets
contain information that can be relevant to the incidents and
are useful to maintaining a flow during the exercise.
B. TQM Requirements and Structure
The TQM tool runs as a standalone application, an outside
entity which is responsible for providing the input data fol-
lowing the API provided. The Prototype uses the fields of the
CTI and information provided of both sender and receiver to
determine the value of metrics. The calculation of the Quality
and Trust is based on available metrics, which are weighted
and combined. The computed scores are outputted in a report
so it can be easily integrated with a Threat Intelligence Sharing
Platform (TISP). The Trust score can also be shared with
other entities using the prototype to later compute overall Trust
score called Reputation. The overall components and flow is
depicted in Figure 1. As can be seen from this figure, the
metrics are extracted and computed from the E-EWS, stored
in a MongoDb database. The stored values are then being
utilised in the Reputation Service to compute the reputation
scores of each organisation in the community of E-EWS.
The Figure 2 depicts a course the ticket follows, high-level
view of both quality and trust computation and the postulated
metrics that could be extracted. A ticket from the E-EWS
is received with the metadata of the ticket, the contents and
additionally, the metadata of the sharing organisation. These
information is then fed to the separate metric extractors as
described in detail in Table I.
C. Trust And Quality Computation
TQM Prototype aims to use several metrics to compute
the Quality score of the information shared based on several
aspects. Derived Quality score should enable organisations to
prioritise the information shared with them, that is relevant,
complete, and actionable. Since past experience is imperative
to building and maintaining Trust, TQM Prototype aims to use
both, computed Trust score together with collective experience
of all organisations reputation, to determine the trustworthiness
of the organisation sharing the information with it.
IV. EVALUATION & CALIBRATION
For the evaluation of the tool and the computation of the
metrics, CTI produced during the aforementioned tabletop
exercises is leveraged.
Tabletop exercise data and the current computation of the
metrics have some limitations which are thoroughly discussed
in the next section. Therefore, The computation of four metrics
Completeness, Extensiveness, Freshness and Quality scores is
executed for over 66 intelligence items from the data taken
from four tabletop exercises.
In the Table I, the computation of these metrics can be
found. As it can be seen, quality metric is defined as a function
of other metrics with the given weights.
In addition to the evaluation of these tickets with the TQM
tool, the produced CTI is evaluated by seven cybersecurity
experts from the participants of the tabletop exercises. For
these 4 metrics, the average value of the metric is calculated
and the computation is adjusted by taking these considerations
into account. Adjusted computation can also be found in the
adjusted computation column of Table II.
The results of the adjusted computation, along with the
expert’s views and the initial computation are presented in
the figures from 3 to 6. As can be seen from these figures
these adjustments calibrated the tool to produce values that
represent and reflect on the expert’s views compared to the
initial computation.
V. DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS
We are aware that the complete development of a tool
requires substantial work; therefore the tool has limitations,
especially related to the different metrics considered, which
have been evolving in an agile manner as soon as a limitation
is detected.
In the table of parameters that TQM measures, it can be
seen that extensiveness is one of the significant limitations.
Extensiveness is evaluated based on the number of optional
parameters which have been filled in; however a modification
in order to weigh not only the number of optional parameters
filled in by the user but also the quality of the information
included by the user can be implemented as future work. To
undertake this new definition of this metric, it will be necessary
to resort to another series of techniques that understand and
assess the quality of the information included by analysing,
among other techniques, the language used by the author of
the CTI.
Fig. 2. Computational flow of a ticket
TABLE I
CTI TRUST AND QUALITY METRICS AND THEIR POSTULATED COMPUTATIONS
Acronym Metric Description How is it determined
CTI.R. CTI rating (=T&Q rat-
ing)
Based on reputation of the source (T) and the attributes of specific
ticket/ warning (Q)
T + Q
T Trustworthiness Calculated as weighted sum of p.s.a., s.c., c.c., p.t.r., p., p.s.
p.s.a. Partner Sharing Activ-
ity
The number of CTI contributions may not be a direct indicator for
trust. Nevertheless, the activity may signal the stakeholder whether
someone is a free-rider or actively interested in a collaboration.
From partner’s activity logs on the E-
EWS.
s.c. Sector of Activity This is defined by the sector that the partner operates; e.g. compe-
tence centre, company specialising in the cybersecurity area
From partner’s metadata when register-
ing for the E-EWS system.
c.c. Certified Cybersecu-
rity
This parameter is defined whether the partner has a certification
for cyber security; e.g. ISO 27001
From partner’s metadata when register-
ing for the E-EWS system.
p.t.r Previous Ticket Rat-
ings
This metric shows the way that past tickets of this source were
rated. Accumulation of quality ratings of tickets is given by all
organisations.
From aggregated feedback for all tickets
shared by this organisation.
p. Privacy The metric is defined by an external tool to check if the content
includes personally identifiable information
From ticket data.
p.s. Partner Sector The trustworthiness increases when two information-sharing enti-
ties belong to the same sector. The user can preselect the sectors
he/she considers relevant/ is dependent on.
from ticket metadata.
Q Quality Calculated as weighted sum of t.c., t.f., t.t., t.e., t.r.
t.c. Completeness Evaluation The metric shows how many mandatory parameters are
filled in when sharing a ticket.
From ticket data.
t.f. Freshness The time passed since the information is shared; it decays as time
passes.
From ticket data. Time between the day
of calculation and the last activity date.
t.t. Timeliness Time between ticket created and ticket shared Time between ticket created and ticket
shared.
t.e. Extensiveness Evaluates how many optional parameters are filled in. From ticket data.
t.r. Relevance For each type of alert source, a list of specific keywords is
predefined along an associated relevance value. The relevance score
is based on the number of keyword occurrences in the alert’s field.
search keywords in the ticket using pre-
defined tags.
R Reputation Reputation of the source can be considered as a collective measure
of trustworthiness (in the sense of reliability) based on the referrals
or ratings from members in a community.
Sum of Trust scores of a community.
In relation to the organisation opinion, this is an issue that
has a certain sensitivity since rating a ticket by users is fine
as long as the users are trustworthy when it comes to making
the rating. An added improvement could identify users and
rate them using an artificial intelligence engine that is capable
of detecting bad ratings that are not true but have been made
TABLE II
COMPUTATIONS OF THE METRICS BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENTS
Initial Computation Adjusted computation
Completeness Base Score (+50), At least one attachment (+25),At least one reference (+25)
Base Score (+40), At least one attachment (+20),
At least one reference (+15), At least one facet(+25)
Extensiveness Base Score(0), One Attachment (+25), Two Attachments (+50),Three Attachments (+75), Four or more (+100))
Attachments (Three or more attachments(+35), Two attachments (+25), One attachment (+10)
References (Five or more references (+30), Three or four references (+20), Two references (+15), One reference (+10))
Facets (Three or more facets (+35), Two facets (+25), One facet (+15))
Freshness
less than 7 days: 100
between 7 days and 30 days: 80
between 30 days and 90 days: 60
between 90 days and 180 days: 40
between 180 days and 365 days: 20
more than 365 days: 0
the last 3 days: 100
between 3 and 7 days: 90
between 7 and 15 days: 80
between 15 and 30 days: 70
between 30 and 90 days: 60
between 90 and 120 days: 50
between 120 and 150 days: 40
between 150 and 180 days: 30
between 180 and 270 days: 20
between 270 and 365 days: 10
more than 365 days: 0
Quality (0.2)*Completeness + (0.4)*Freshness + (0.4) Extensiveness (0.2)*Completeness + (0.4)*Freshness + (0.4) Extensiveness
Fig. 3. Original and Calibrated Completeness Values with Expert’s View on
Individual Tickets
Fig. 4. Original and Calibrated Extensiveness Values with Expert’s View on
Individual Tickets
with some kind of intention other than the quality of the CTI.
The calculation of freshness is based on the measurement
between the current time and the last activity date. Using this
metric on the Tabletop data has lead to the conclusion that
since all the tickets had been generated several months ago,
the metric indicated a low freshness. However, we believe
that a possible improvement of this metric could be made
by combining the current measurement with the subsequent
relevance of the ticket. If a ticket is subsequently viewed by
a certain number of users or used to consider the aspects
which are reflected in the ticket; it could inspire possible new
Fig. 5. Original and Calibrated Freshness Values with Expert’s View on
Individual Tickets
Fig. 6. Original and Calibrated Quality Values with Expert’s View on
Individual Tickets
tickets. Based on that information, it would also indicate part
of that freshness or timeliness of the information that the ticket
contains.
In relation to the completeness metric, we realised that not
only we had to measure whether the information or certain
fields had been filled in by the user but also that this complete-
ness should measure that the information is reflected in the
appropriate section following the ticket structure defined. For
example, the references should be added in the references field
and not in the body of the ticket. We also had to modify the
metric so that in the cases that the user had put the references
in the body of the ticket, it was taken into computation by the
tool, even if the user had not followed the defined structure.
The limitations of the prototype are rooted from the pre-
ferred metrics devised to measure quality and based on the
effort to capture and formulate the different aspects of quality.
Therefore, the next step for the development of this tool is
to create complex and combined metrics so that TQM could
automatically contrast the quality of the information entered
by a user and that the quality score is more accurate and
instrumental when displaying or sorting tickets within the
E-EWS. Provision of this will be giving much more useful
context information for users who view and analyse the tickets
shared by different organisations in the E-EWS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an evaluation tool for the quality and the
trustworthiness merits of CTI is presented. The metrics and
dimensions of the CTI are postulated and presented in a
structured configuration. By leveraging sixty six intelligence
items produced from four tabletop exercises to improve the
capturing of the characteristics of these items, the results of
the evaluation show that with the use of computed metrics,
the overall trustworthiness and quality of CTI content can
eventually be improved and contribute to the increase of the
maturity of information-sharing within the E-EWS and(or)
other information-sharing platforms.
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